| LC control no. | sh2007006749 |
|---|---|
| Topical heading | Propositional attitudes |
| See also | Attitude (Psychology) Thought and thinking |
| Found in | Work cat.: Richard, M. Propositional attitudes : an essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them, 1990. Encyc. of philosophy, c2006, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007 (Two entries: "Propositional Attitudes: Issues in Semantics" and "Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology"; propositional attitudes like knowledge, belief, and assertion play an important foundational role for semantic theory; often cited as the paradigmatic example of this mental state.) Sutherland dict. of psychology, 1996 (propositional attitude (Philosophy): any proposition expressing an attitude towards some aspect of the world, e.g. a belief, hope, fear, doubt, wish, etc.) Concise Routledge encyc. of philosophy, 2000, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007: propositional attitude statements (Propositional attitude statements--statements about our beliefs, desires, hopes and fears--exhibit certain logical peculiarities) Stanford encyc. of philosophy, via WWW, Aug. 10, 2007 (Propositional attitude reports concern the cognitive relations people bear to propositions) Blackburn, S. The Oxford dict. of philosophy, 1994 (propositional attitudes: the term suggests that knowing what someone believes, etc. is a matter of identifying an abstract object of their thought, rather than understanding his or her orientation towards more worldly objects.) The Cambridge dict. of philosophy, 1999 (propositional attitude, under proposition: an abstract object said to be that to which a person is related by a belief, desire, or other psychological attitude, typically expressed in language containing a psychological verb ("think," "deny," "doubt," etc. followed by a that-clause. The psychological states in question are called propositional attitudes.) |
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